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Deliberation and Reason
by Richard Baron
About the Book
The
book is about the thinking in which we engage when we reflectively
decide what to do, and when we reflectively reach conclusions as to the
correct answers to questions. Some philosophers rigorously separate our
choices of action from our adoptions of belief, on the ground that we
have choices as to what to do, but no choice as to what to believe. I
treat the two together when considering processes of deliberation, but
separately when considering the rationality of conclusions.
The main objective is to identify a way of looking at ourselves and at
our deliberations that is adequate to our lives. It must accommodate
both our conception of ourselves as free, rational and self-directed
subjects, and the phenomenology of deliberation. It must also identify
a place for us that will feel like home, doing justice to our status as
subjects, within the world as we relate to it when we practise the
natural sciences. The central claims are not about how we are, but
about how we should look at ourselves.
A key task is to show that this limited ambition, which is forced on us
by the need to avoid metaphysical implausibility, nonetheless allows us
to develop a position that has sufficient strength to do its work. The
aim is to show something that is all too easily taken for granted. This
is that we can limit ourselves to a strictly naturalistic ontology,
while still having access to a generous idiom that allows us to speak
of ourselves as free in the exercise of our rationality.
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Title:
Deliberation and Reason
Author: Richard Baron
Publisher:
Matador
ISBN: 978 184876
250 3
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Summary
The principal topic of the book is how we
deliberate. In the first three chapters, I concentrate on processes of
deliberation. In chapters 4 and 5, the discussion broadens out to
encompass both the conclusions that deliberators reach, and the
relationship of those conclusions to the starting points of available
information and of methods of using it. In chapter 6, I discuss some
problems in the philosophy of science. That chapter ends with a link
between the scientific view of the world and the proposals that are
made in chapters 2 and 3.
Each of the first three chapters includes one stage in the discussion
of the process of deliberation. In chapter 1, I set out the work to be
done. I motivate the discussion, outline a model of deliberation, put
forward two contrasting views of the process, the program view and the
view that sees deliberation with mastery, and argue for the latter
view. In chapter 2, I set out a way to see deliberation with mastery,
argue that we must overlook the causal closure of the physical, and
start to develop a picture of ourselves that will make the overall
proposal acceptable. In chapter 3, I develop this picture further,
argue that my proposal is both acceptable and adequate to the task, and
consider other approaches that are in play in the same field.
Chapter 4 is about rational action. The focus shifts from the process
of deliberation to its results, choices of action. But the process
still matters, because actions are rational if they are chosen in
appropriate ways. In chapter 5, I make a parallel shift from processes
of deliberation that are undertaken in order to answer questions, to
the answers at which we arrive. I consider why we have to face
epistemological questions, the criteria for a belief to be regarded as
acquired rationally, and how we can fend off one type of scepticism. In
chapter
6, I focus on a particular type of knowledge, the type that we get from
the natural sciences. I consider the origins of questions in the
philosophy of science and the reasons why we have to face those
questions. The final section reconciles a scientific view of the world
with a view of the world as populated by human subjects.
Chapter 1: Deliberation
In section 1.1, I start by distinguishing between processes of
deliberation and the conclusions that deliberators reach, then set out
why we can treat choices of action and adoptions of belief together
when we are concerned with processes. I then set out the motivation for
the argument. This is the need for a philosophy that is true to our
lives, meaning both our self-conception and our experience of
deliberation. Finally, I discuss the idea of a way of looking at
ourselves and at our deliberations.
In section 1.2, I set out a model of our processes of deliberation. A
selection stage, in which we select both weights to attach to pieces of
evidence and a method of argument, is followed by a calculation stage.
I discuss the acceptability, and the limited implications, of the
degree of idealization that is involved in the use of this model. I
pick out the evidence of which the subject is aware, and the prior
inclinations of the subject, as the rational antecedents of the
process. I also address the risk of doxastic voluntarism.
In section 1.3, I set out the program view, the view that sees a
process of deliberation as the execution of a program that is foisted
on the subject. The contents of the program will reflect both the prior
inclinations of the subject to think in certain ways, and the evidence
that has come to the subject’s notice.
In section 1.4, I first argue that it is important for us to attribute
a strong form of freedom to ourselves. I then argue that the program
view is inadequate to our self-conception as free, rational and
self-directed subjects. I put forward a different view, that of
deliberation with mastery. If we take that view, then we see the
subject as freely making an intervention in the process that is
extraneous to the program. I set out three arguments for taking that
view, arguments that are respectively based on our self-conception, on
our social relationships and on the phenomenology of deliberation. In
section 1.5, I compare the view that sees us as deliberating with
mastery with other views.
Chapter 2: How to see mastery
If we should see ourselves as having mastery, we must understand how to
see ourselves in that light, and the implications of doing so. Chapter
2 covers that ground.
In section 2.1, I baldly assert that we should simply see mastery, and
note that in order to make this assertion acceptable, a fuller picture
must be developed and must be related to our scientific view of the
world. In section 2.2, I set out the relationship between deliberation
with mastery and the causal closure of the physical. The latter must be
overlooked in order to allow us to see the former. This raises the
question of how we are to see deliberation as being appropriately
controlled. In section 2.3, I introduce a way to supply the required
control. Decisions are to be seen as originating in the subject at the
time of decision, and not as following from antecedents. The relevant
process is called subject origination. In section 2.4, I set out two
conceptions of humanity, the naturalistic conception and the originator
conception. The latter conception sees us as engaging in subject
origination, and it is therefore the right conception for my proposal.
Setting out the two conceptions highlights the non-naturalistic nature
of my proposal.
Chapter 3: Subject origination
In chapter 3, I argue that the concept of subject origination can do
the job that it has to do. I also compare my approach with some
approaches of other philosophers. In section 3.1, I locate subject
origination and the originator conception in relation to the
naturalistic conception of ourselves and in relation to agent
causation. Section 3.2 covers the phenomenology of subject origination.
Section 3.3 covers both the need to be able to enter into one another’s
heads, and what is involved in doing so. In section 3.4, I consider the
range of beings to which we would attribute subject origination. Robots
and aliens are both likely to be excluded, but for different reasons.
In section 3.5, I argue that the concept of subject origination is
sufficient to do its job. There are two types of sufficiency at stake,
sufficiency of content and sufficiency of status. Content is supplied
from elsewhere. The status in question is that of being a mere way of
looking at our processes of deliberation. I consider two specific
aspects of the work that the concept of subject origination might do,
the explanation of human actions and the attribution of responsibility
for those actions. In section 3.6, I consider the legitimacy of use of
the concept of subject origination. The relationship between the view
of ourselves that is given when it is used and the scientific view is
crucial here. I also consider the standards which ensure that the view
that is given is not an arbitrary view.
In section 3.7, I consider other approaches that are in play in the
same field as subject origination. Agent causation differs from subject
origination primarily because its proponents mostly seek to establish
the existence of something that is in the world, alongside event
causation. The intentional stance, as proposed by Daniel Dennett,
contrasts with the originator conception because it could be adopted
while conceiving of humanity in purely scientific terms. There would,
however, be significant difficulty in arriving at the correct
intentional stance to adopt without drawing on our own inner
experience. In section 3.8, I propose a concept of the subject that
allows us to see ourselves as engaging in subject origination.
Chapter 4: Rational action
In chapter 4, I move on from how we see processes of deliberation, to
how we evaluate their results. The results are, however, not to be
evaluated in isolation. If a choice of action is to be seen as
rational, the agent must be seen as having deliberated appropriately.
This shift from the inner to the outer is described in section 4.1. I
use the concept of rational action as a centrepiece, around which to
arrange several other concepts. In section 4.2, I explore the
relationships between rational actions and reasons, and survey the
attitudes that an observer of a putatively rational action might have
toward its rationality. I also touch on the source of our standards of
rationality. In section 4.3, I discuss the concept of
self-consciousness and its relationship with the concept of action. In
section 4.4, I discuss the concept of consciousness, and note the
limited extent to which consciousness need be understood for present
purposes. Specifically, the so-called hard problem of consciousness
need not be solved. In section 4.5, I discuss the concept of choice and
the constraints on our attributions of choice.
Chapter 5: Knowledge
This chapter is concerned with epistemological questions. In section
5.1, I explore the source of those questions and set out the high price
of avoiding them. We would have to keep propositions, as potential
objects of propositional attitudes, out of the picture. That would in
turn require an inhuman detachment from those around us. In section
5.2, I identify a connection between seeing ourselves as deliberating
with mastery and the concept of knowledge. In section 5.3, I make a
move from the inner to the outer that parallels the move that was made
in chapter 4, by considering criteria for a belief to count as held
rationally. The ability to respond to challenges is central here. After
arguing for the importance of this ability, both as evidence that a
belief has been acquired rationally, and as having an intrinsic
relationship to our standards of rationality, I consider the
possibility of rational computers. I then consider the sources of our
standards of rationality. In section 5.4, I consider scepticism. I
start by identifying one type of scepticism, the claim that we cannot
have satisfactory justification for our beliefs, and the bearing of our
concept of rationally acquired belief on that scepticism. I then argue
that if the sceptic is to unnerve us, which is the most that he can do
if we forswear certainty, he must use the purely structural form of his
argument. I then argue that he fails because he is insufficiently
liberal in the variety of structures of justifications that he will
admit. Even circular arguments can provide justification, so long as
the circles are large enough, despite the consequent potential for
equally good justifications for contradictory conclusions.
Chapter 6: Science
In this chapter, I discuss the sources of some questions in the
philosophy of science, and then give a picture of our place as subjects
in the objective world. In section 6.1, I outline the relationship
between scientific results and their interpretation. Interpretation
gives rise to questions in the philosophy of science, just as the
exposure of propositions to propositional attitudes gives rise to
epistemological questions. In section 6.2, I discuss the scope to avoid
interpretation within part of physics. In section 6.3, I argue that
interpretation enters into the practice of science in the higher
sciences, so that it is inevitable. Our use of the concept of causation
is a particularly striking example. In section 6.4, I explore some
links between that concept and the concept of rational action. In
section 6.5, I consider the debate between realism, anti-realism and
structural realism. Finally, in section 6.6, I draw some threads
together by discussing the relationship between the scientific
conception of the world and our status as subjects within the world.
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